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Note 
Accuracy or Efficiency: Has Grain Processing 
Made a Difference? 
George David Kidd* 
Since the Federal Circuit’s adoption of Panduit’s causation 
standard1 for establishing entitlement to lost profits damages 
in patent litigation, application of its noninfringing alternatives 
prong has lacked consistency.2 The court’s decision in Grain 
Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., however, 
created an additional contribution to the Panduit standard, 
thereby raising the evidentiary bar while significantly altering 
the noninfringing-alternative inquiry.3 Grain Processing has 
given the infringer a potentially powerful defensive mechanism 
in an area in which patentees are generally favored,4 even 
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 1. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he presence or absence of acceptable noninfringing 
alternatives does not matter.”). 
 3. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–
51 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 4. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent Damages and Real Options: How 
Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to 
Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 826 (2007) (“[A]n infringer could claim 
that it would have continued to sell a noninfringing product that it had 
actually been selling and that this product would have captured some of the 
infringing sales. This argument would tend to limit the patent holder’s lost 
sales. However, the infringer could not claim that it would have developed and 
introduced some new noninfringing product in the but-for world and that this 
product would have captured some of the infringing sales. Grain Processing 
eased this restriction, allowing an infringer to claim that it would have offered 
a noninfringing product that, although not actually sold in the marketplace, 
was technically feasible at the time and could have been made commercially 
available relatively quickly.”). 
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when some infringement may be socially desirable.5 Grain 
Processing allows for the potential avoidance of lost profit 
damages, so long as the alleged infringer shows that it had the 
necessary equipment, know-how, and experience to produce an 
acceptable, noninfringing substitute during the alleged 
infringement period.6 
The Grain Processing decision, however, raises some 
debate.7 As a judicially interjected gloss on damages, the added 
ability to limit damage awards to a reasonable royalty could 
have been too drastic.8 A closer look demonstrates a precarious 
policy balance. On the one hand, increases in patent litigation9 
                                                          
 5. David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1791 (2012); cf. Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1 (“[S]ome patents are so broad that they allow 
patent holders to claim sweeping ownership of seemingly unrelated products 
built by others. Often, companies are sued for violating patents they never 
knew existed or never dreamed might apply to their creations, at a cost 
shouldered by consumers in the form of higher prices and fewer choices.”); 
Matthew Yglesias, Why Should We Stop Online Piracy?, SLATE.COM (Jan. 18, 
2012, 2:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/
01/sopa_stopping_online_piracy_would_be_a_social_and_economic_disaster_.h
tml (examining, in the context of illegal downloading, the idea that violating 
intellectual property law could aid in reducing economic deadweight loss). 
 6. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1354 (“[T]he [district] court found that 
American Maize had all of the necessary equipment, know-how, and 
experience to use Process IV to make Lo-Dex 10 . . . .”). The Federal Circuit 
went on to hold that “the district court did not err in considering an 
alternative not on the market during the period of infringement, nor did it 
clearly err in determining that the alternative was available, acceptable, and 
precluded any lost profits.” Id. at 1356. 
 7. See Alexander I. Poltorak & Paul J. Lerner, Grain, Grain, Go Away, 
INTELL. PROP. WORLDWIDE, http://www.generalpatent.com/files/Grain.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (“The test of noninfringing substitutes has never been as 
clear as it might. The definition of ‘substitute’ and ‘available’ are both subject 
to debate. In fact, this test ‘accounts for more appellate litigation . . . than any 
other aspect of patent damages law,’ according to Paul M. Janicke in a 1993 
American University Law Review article.”). 
 8. Id. (arguing that the Grain Processing standard lacks clarity and, 
taken to its logical conclusion, limits the value of patents to a reasonable 
royalty while additionally reducing the likelihood that a defendant will settle); 
see also Mark Chretien, The Question of Availability: Grain Processing Corp. 
v. American Maize-Products Co., 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1489, 1505 (2002) 
(explaining that, although Grain Processing strays from legal precedent, the 
case emphasizes the “creation of a realistic hypothetical marketplace for the 
purpose of damage calculations”). 
 9. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 
(2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/
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might justify implementing an additional hurdle to potential 
damage awards in order to further incentivize innovation. 
Added rigor provided by Grain Processing may deter frivolous 
and expensive litigation that might be asserted by patentees to 
keep new innovators out of the market.10 But on the other 
hand, if a market participant does unlawfully infringe, it is 
certainly reasonable to believe that the infringer should pay 
appropriate damages for the encroachment on another’s 
intellectual property. Grain Processing’s lost-profit-limiting 
defense against a patentee’s claim of entitlement to lost profits 
damages may serve to deter potentially useful innovation by 
increasing costs shouldered by patentees in defending their 
patent rights.11 
This Note analyzes six Federal Circuit cases appealing lost 
profits determinations, decided both before and after Grain 
Processing, and attempts to discern the impacts that Grain 
Processing has had on patentees’ entitlements to lost profits. 
This Note is organized in four parts. Part I provides the 
historical and substantive context necessary to understand the 
Grain Processing decision and examines important statutory 
changes, especially their subsequent interpretation, both before 
and after Grain Processing. Part II summarizes three pre-, as 
well as three post-Grain Processing cases. Parts III and IV 
dissect and analyze the holdings in these cases and evaluate 
Grain Processing’s impact on patent damages. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The general structure of patent infringement litigation can 
be broken down into two steps: (1) claim construction; and (2) a 
                                                          
publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding a dramatic rise in 
patent actions filed in 2011 over 2010). 
 10. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1 (“One consequence of [patent 
litigation] . . . is that patent disputes are suffocating the culture of start-ups 
that has long fueled job growth and technological innovation.”). 
 11. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 826–27 (“By providing potential 
infringers with increased option value if they use the patented technology, 
Grain Processing reduces the deterrent effect of litigation and therefore 
encourages infringement. Consequently, it reduces the returns to research and 
development, and so also the incentives to innovate.”); see also James J. Anton 
& Dennis A. Yao, Finding “Lost” Profits: An Equilibrium Analysis of Patent 
Infringement Damages, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 186, 188 (2007) (“[B]asing 
damages on lost profits reduces the incentive to innovate relative to the 
benchmark case (no infringement).”). 
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comparison between the allegedly infringing product and 
patent claim language as interpreted in the claim construction 
step.12 First, as a matter of law, the court construes the “scope 
and meaning” of each patent claim in order to define the 
protection granted by the patent.13 Next, a fact finder compares 
each claim to the allegedly infringing product to determine 
whether that product has “infringed” by exceeding claim 
limitations protected by the patent-in-suit.14 During this second 
step, a fact finder may also determine the amount of damages 
owed in the event the patent was violated.15 
A patentee’s entitlement to, and amount of, patent 
damages is firmly rooted in normative considerations, which 
generally seek to further societal good.16 An exclusive right for 
a patentee to make, use, and sell an invented article is meant 
to incentivize useful innovation.17 But this time-limited 
monopoly right, of malevolent repute,18 may also be generally 
associated with “raising prices of commodities” and “hurt of 
                                                          
 12. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 142 
(2d ed. 2004); Shawn Kolitch, Patent Claim Construction: The Neglected 
Preamble, OR. INTELL. PROP. NEWSL., Summer 2007, at 10, available at 
http://www.khpatent.com/files/9492SJK_Patent_Claim_Construction.pdf. 
 13. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 142; Kolitch, supra note 12, at 10. 
 14. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 142–43; Kolitch, supra note 12, at 10. 
 15. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82 (“When a court, with or without a 
jury, finds a patent both valid and infringed, then it must decide what 
remedies to grant the patentee . . . . [A] remedy available to a patentee is an 
award of money damages to compensate for past infringement.”). But see infra 
note 54 and accompanying text (discussing how the process may differ if the 
trial is bifurcated). 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 217 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 
1982) (“The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common 
law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the 
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of 
individuals.”). 
 17. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (explaining that 
patent laws confer the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
offering for sale a patented invention in the United States for the term of the 
patent). The Patent Act “was passed for the purpose of encouraging useful 
invention and promoting new and useful improvements by the protection and 
stimulation thereby given to inventive genius . . . .” Id. 
 18. See Sheldon Richman, Patents Stifle Prosperity, PROJECT TO RESTORE 
AM. (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.theprojecttorestoreamerica.com/Essay/
191/Patents-Stifle-Prosperity (“Intellectual ‘property’ throttles the competitive 
process by bestowing monopoly power on big corporate players, creating 
artificial scarcities at the expense of consumers and independent 
entrepreneurs.”). 
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trade.”19 Insofar as the Constitution gives the power to the 
people to decide the delicate balance between the innovative 
good and the monopoly bad,20 the U.S. patent law system 
nonetheless vigorously defends against an infringer’s 
encroachment on a patentee’s patent rights.21 
Over the past two-hundred years, patent law damages 
have largely been left to judicial determination.22 As a stern 
admonition against an alleged infringer, reprimand in the form 
of compensatory damages may be derived through a court’s or a 
jury’s interpretation of expert calculation of the damages 
necessary to compensate for infringement.23 Because the 
system is concerned with compensation to the patent holder, 
patentees have used their patent rights as a weapon, by 
threatening litigation against other market players, to broaden 
market penetration and to acquire new licensees.24 The threat 
                                                          
 19. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [to] 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
 21. See S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluation of the 
American Patent System, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 555, 555 (1951) (“The 
exclusiveness of patent rights is regarded as a short-term public welfare 
monopoly which promotes the competitive economy of which the Patent 
System is itself a vital part.”). 
 22. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (“Because no version of the Patent Act has 
ever specified exactly how to calculate the compensatory or restitutionary 
damages called for in the statutory text, the task of formulating workable 
standards has always rested with the courts.”); see SmithKline Diagnostics, 
Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing 
that the amount of damages is a finding of fact subject to the “clearly 
erroneous” standard of review, while “subsidiary decisions underlying a 
damage theory are discretionary with the court, such as, the choice of an 
accounting method for determining profit margin” and are reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 23. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82 (“[One] remedy available to a 
patentee is an award of money damages to compensate for past infringement. 
While injunctions are a matter within the discretion of the judge, the 
calculation of damages is a question for the jury.”); id. at 182 n.60 (“This is 
assuming that the case was tried to a jury. If the parties waived their right to 
a jury trial, the judge would determine all issues of fact, including the amount 
of damages.”); see infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1 (discussing a situation where 
sudden business decisions utilized patents as a way to exclude other market 
players in the voice recognition industry resulting in the investment of 
“millions of dollars . . . set aside for research and development . . . [being] 
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of, or actual, patent litigation and the potential for material 
damages may stymy innovation by erecting an additional 
barrier to market entry of an alleged infringer.25 More recent 
debate has centered on the results of demanding a greater 
degree of accuracy in damage determinations through more 
extensive litigation,26 rather than stressing more efficient and 
less costly means. 
With infringement enforcement mechanisms left in the 
hands of market participants, those who benefit from 
constraining competitor activity in, or entry into, a marketplace 
are given the tools necessary to threaten or force broad, 
comprehensive litigation.27 In an atmosphere of “patent 
floggings” of entering market participants accused of alleged 
infringement, the courts have furnished these alleged 
infringers with protection against damages in excess of a 
reasonable royalty, namely through the Grain Processing 
decision.28 An extensive battle over the more precise factors 
from Grain Processing might benefit society by increasing the 
                                                          
redirected to lawyers and court fees”). Though perhaps not impacted by Grain 
Processing since they do not commercialize inventions, non-practicing entities, 
or “patent trolls,” also could be said to use patent rights as a weapon. Ahmed 
J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving 
Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 836 (2012) (“A patent troll is an entity 
that focuses solely on capitalizing on patent portfolios. The troll purchases or 
otherwise obtains patents from other companies for the purposes of licensing 
and enforcing them, rather than practicing any inventions covered by those 
patents.”). 
 25. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2004) (“[T]he risk of being sued, and 
demands by patent holders for royalty payments to avoid being sued, are seen 
increasingly as major costs of bringing new products and processes to market. 
Thus, the patent system—intended to foster and protect innovation—is 
generating waste and uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative 
process.”); see, e.g., Steve Lohr, Widening Scrutiny of Google’s Smartphone 
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at B1 (describing a Federal Trade 
Commission investigation into Google’s licensing practices with regards to its 
patents on standard-essential technology for smartphones). 
 26. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent 
Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698 (2004) (providing some current debate on 
the accuracy-ease tradeoff, where a patentee might simply pay the infringer to 
leave the market rather than deal with the cost and hassle of patent 
litigation). 
 27. See, e.g., Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 5, at A1. 
 28. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,  
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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accuracy and fairness of the damages determination. But, the 
reality may be that increased accuracy and cost in calculating 
damages provided by more extensive litigation could lead to a 
systemic loss by deterring useful litigation and wasting limited 
resources best used for innovation.29 Whether the shield of 
Grain Processing provides ample protection for defendants as a 
well-adapted tool, or merely prolongs litigation and wastes 
valuable resources, may reveal whether the courts have gone 
too far, or not far enough, in injecting additional rigor into the 
patent system. 
A. BRIEF HISTORY 
Law concerned with the allocation and degree of protection 
afforded to a patentee has historically endeavored to walk the 
fine line between monopoly rights and adequate patent 
protection.30 The result of this balancing has exerted a 
controlling grasp on the language and construction of today’s 
patent law system. From 1870 to 1946, patent law allowed 
recovery for the greater of “profits” made by the infringer or 
“damages” sustained by the patentee caused by infringement.31 
                                                          
 29. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 852 (“Under Grain Processing, courts 
permit an infringer to claim that in the but-for world it would have adopted an 
existing noninfringing technology despite the fact that the infringer had never 
done so. This free option transfers economic value to the infringer and 
transfers economic value away from the patent holder. Thus, it decreases the 
economic incentives to innovate, which is one of the primary goals of the U.S. 
patent system.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, 
Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exclusion 
Payments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 712, 712 (2003) (“[L]aw must often choose 
between simple rules that are prone to error and more complex rules that are 
more accurate but harder to administer.”); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE 
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 29–36 (1995) (proposing that a return to simple 
legal rules would have efficiency- and cost-related benefits). 
 30. See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, Patents and Monopolization: The Role of 
Patents Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 560–62 
(1985) (“The owner of the patent has the right to exclude others from making, 
using or selling the patented invention . . . . Thus, there is power to exclude 
competition . . . . Consequently, it is necessary to forge a compromise between 
the conflicting policies of rewarding the inventor for the voluntary public 
disclosure of the invention while protecting the public from untoward 
intrusions into the domain of a free and open competitive market in which all 
competitors can participate without unreasonable restraints.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 31. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 6, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (“[U]pon a 
decree being rendered in any such case for an infringement the complainant 
shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the 
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The distinction between the two methods may only be a 
remnant of the law-equity court system, because courts of law 
only allowed damages while courts of equity only allowed 
disgorgement of profit.32 Justification for profit recovery during 
this period relied upon “word-play and 
fiction . . . characteriz[ing] such infringer’s profits as ‘unjust 
enrichment’ or ‘constructive trust,’ then in effect order[ing] 
‘restitution’ thereof, and then denominat[ing] the result as 
‘damages.’”33 As a result, courts would characterize either 
method of recovery as remedial.34 Profit recovery, however, 
could have historically played a punitive role, at least in part.35 
Once a patentee’s rights were violated, retribution would be 
handed out by judicial sanction with the infringer’s profit as 
the amount due the patentee.36 Thus, historically, the patent 
system embraced a variety of ways a patentee could opt to 
enforce its right to exclude others.37 
The statutory precursor to the damage provisions of the 
Patent Act of 1952 came into effect in 1946.38 The damages 
                                                          
defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby . . . .”); Blair & 
Cotter, supra note 22, at 6; DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT 
LAW 1286 (3d ed. 2004); see Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 
U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (“In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is 
‘profits,’ what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement is 
‘damages.’” (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306, 
306 (2d Cir. 1908))). 
 32. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1285. 
 33. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 528 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
 34. Id. at 539. 
 35. See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(examining disgorgement of profit from “‘[j]udicial sanctions in civil contempt 
proceedings . . . [as] employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the 
defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the 
complainant for losses sustained’” (quoting United States v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947))). Compare DOUG RENDLEMAN, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 
865–66 (2010) (examining whether disgorgement of profits in a contempt 
proceeding is actually a penalty/fine for criminal contempt), with Leman v. 
Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 453–57 (1932) (describing profit 
disgorgement as full compensation in a contempt proceeding as remedial, not 
penal, in nature). 
 36. See Spindelfabrik, 903 F.2d at 1578–80. 
 37. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1285–86. 
 38. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778; Blair & Cotter, supra note 
22, at 6. 
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portion of the 1946 act advanced to roughly its present form 
and revised the historic “damages or profits” language.39 After 
passage, the Supreme Court effectively interpreted away 
Congress’s omission of profit recovery as divesting courts of 
authority to order “restitutionary relief.”40 Under the 1946 Act, 
only “general damages” in the form of “due compensation” were 
recoverable.41 The purpose of the change was to restrict 
compensation to the value of the loss rather than the value of 
the infringer’s gain.42 By eliminating profit recovery, Congress 
sought to ensure that the patentee would receive full 
compensation for “any damages” he suffered as a result of the 
infringement.43 The patentee could not, as a matter of common 
law, recover prejudgment interest.44 Accordingly, the damages 
                                                          
 39. Compare Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392 
(“[T]he complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be 
accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained 
thereby . . . .”), with Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (“[T]he 
complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be due 
compensation . . . .”). 
 40. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1286 (“In 1946, Congress again 
changed the law in a way that was later interpreted by the Supreme Court to 
eliminate effectively the patentee’s right to obtain the infringer’s profits.”); see 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505–07 
(1964); Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
 41. Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (“[U]pon a judgment being 
rendered in any case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to 
recover general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using, 
or selling the invention . . . .”). 
 42. Aro, 377 U.S. at 505–06 (“‘The object of the bill is to make the basis of 
recovery in patent-infringement suits general damages, that is, any damages 
the complainant can prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together with 
interest from the time infringement occurred, rather than profits and 
damages.’ There can be no doubt that the amendment succeeded in 
effectuating this purpose; it is clear that under the present statute only 
damages are recoverable.” (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, 
at 1–2 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946) (remarks of Senator Pepper))); 
see also Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 668 (2010) (“Justice 
Brennan categorically declares the ‘clear’ congressional purpose was to 
eliminate recovery stemming from the infringer’s profits.”). 
 43. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, at 1 (1946) (“The object of the bill is to 
make the basis of recovery in patent-infringement suits general damages, that 
is, any damages the complainant can prove . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 
(1946). 
 44. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 651 (1983) (“Prior to 
1946 the provision of the patent laws concerning a plaintiff’s recovery in an 
infringement action contained no reference to interest. The award of interest 
in patent cases was governed by the common law standard enunciated in 
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regime moved toward “award[ing] the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”45 
The 1952 revisions to the Patent Act were adopted for the 
purpose of clarifying the overall presentation and readability of 
statutory structure.46 The 1946 rule, which granted the 
patentee compensatory damages upon proof of infringement, 
was readopted.47 The Supreme Court has since clarified the 
standard as the amount the patentee would have made “had 
the infringer not infringed.”48 Further, the Supreme Court, in 
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., allowed recovery of pre-
judgment interest as a part of compensatory damages, which 
was not previously allowed under the 1946 common-law 
standard.49 
B. BROADER POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
While much has changed throughout U.S. patent law 
history, systemic patent law goals have remained the same. 
The goals of compensation to aggrieved patentees and 
deterrence of infringement continue to underlie present legal 
determinations.50 These twin aims, however, are based upon 
the assumption that they increase, rather than decrease, 
                                                          
several decisions of this Court.” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Duplate Corp. v. 
Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 459 (1936) (discussing the common law 
standard denying prejudgment interest). 
 45. Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 655 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284); see also Ric-
Wil Co. v. E. B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 1950). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10, 29 (1952). 
 47. See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) (“[T]he court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer . . . .”). 
 48. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 
(1964). 
 49. Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 653 (“We have little doubt that § 284 does not 
incorporate the Duplate standard. Under that standard, which evolved as a 
matter of federal common law, prejudgment interest could not be awarded 
where damages were unliquidated, absent bad faith or other exceptional 
circumstances. By contrast, § 284 gives a court general authority to fix 
interest and costs. On the face of § 284, a court’s authority to award interest is 
not restricted to exceptional circumstances . . . .”). 
 50. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1284 (“One infringement-remedy 
goal is to compensate for past infringement . . . . The other . . . is to prevent 
future infringement.”). 
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societal good,51 even though allowance for some forms of lesser 
punishment for infringement may potentially lead to more and 
rapid innovative gains. In this way, the degree of punishment 
experienced or avoided by an infringer can be seen as one of the 
ingredients of innovation. So, in a Darwinian marketplace, 
factors that affect participants, such as needs for adequate 
market returns or an enhanced learning-curve advantage over 
competitors, coexist with concerns about patent infringement, 
and altogether they provide incentives to innovate.52 
C. DAMAGE REMEDIES 
1. Use of Jury, Bifurcation, and Damages Experts 
During the course of litigation, a patentee often relies upon 
specialized experts to assess infringement damages allegedly 
caused by the infringer.53 Because arguments over damages are 
necessary only after a jury decides whether or not a patent is 
infringed, trials are sometimes bifurcated.54 In this way, a trial 
is initially conducted to determine the existence of the alleged 
infringer’s liability, and if liability against the infringer is 
found, a further proceeding addresses damages.55 Separating a 
trial into two parts may help focus issues and may avoid 
                                                          
 51. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 221, 221–30 (2011) (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
tradeoffs between the patent system’s two goals of compensation and 
deterrence). 
 52. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Competition Policy, Patent 
Law, and Innovation: Welcoming Remarks for the Patent Reform Conference 
(June 9, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/
050609comppolicy.pdf. 
 53. See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent 
Cases, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 (1999) (“The damages phase of a patent lawsuit 
involves testimony on the amount and methodology of computing damages, 
and, if lost profits are sought, the appropriateness of awarding damages. 
Generally, there are four categories of damages experts: (1) accounting 
experts; (2) patent licensing experts; (3) industry experts; and (4) 
economists.”). 
 54. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 178 (“One common practice is to hold 
separate trials on liability and damages. If the infringer is not found liable, 
there is no need to proceed with the damages phase.”); see Kathleen B. 
Shields, The Bifurcation Divide, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/Shields,%20Lee%20-%20Law360%20-
%20The%20Bifurcation%20Divide.pdf (discussing some of the costs and 
benefits of bifurcation and the varying views of its usage in patent trials). 
 55. Shields, supra note 54. 
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confusion of the jury, as well as save unnecessary effort.56 In 
many patent infringement cases, however, trials are not 
bifurcated for purported reasons of cost and efficiency.57 In 
these cases, the same jury makes both liability and damages 
determinations in the same trial.58 Litigants may decide to 
retain damages experts far in advance of trial to assess 
complex damages issues.59 Accordingly, experts calculate 
damages under the presumption of infringement by the 
defendant.60 
2. Georgia-Pacific Defines Reasonable Royalty Damages 
If infringement of a patent-in-suit is ultimately found 
against an alleged infringer, the patentee is entitled to no less 
than a reasonable royalty as compensation.61 A royalty is a 
payment made to the patent holder by a licensee in exchange 
for the right to make, use, sell, or import the patented article.62 
                                                          
 56. Id. 
 57. E.g., In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(referring to bifurcation as “too onerous to be regularly employed”); Trading 
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836–37 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(“Although the ultimate decision to bifurcate is within our discretion, because 
we are expected to act to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action, bifurcation remains the exception, not the rule. 
Patent cases are no exception to this rule. The party seeking separate trials 
has the burden of showing that judicial economy would be served and the 
balance of potential prejudice weighs in favor of bifurcation.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 58. See DURHAM, supra note 12, at 181–82. 
 59. See, e.g., JOHN O. MIRICK & KENNETH C. PICKERING, MASSACHUSETTS 
EXPERT WITNESSES 2-2 to 2-3 (2d ed. 2010); Poplawski, supra note 53, at 17 
(“As most patent cases do not reach the damage phase of trial, because of 
settlement, damages experts are not ordinarily retained at the initial stages of 
the litigation. Therefore, many litigants conclude that early use of damages 
experts amounts to considerable unnecessary expense. Nevertheless, where 
the damages issues are complex or the potential damages are relatively high, 
trial counsel would do well to retain damages experts at an earlier stage in the 
litigation.”). 
 60. Poplawski, supra note 53, at 17. 
 61. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant 
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made 
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court.”). 
 62. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 47 (“A licensor retains ownership of the 
patent but grants the licensee the right to practice the claimed invention, 
usually in exchange for some sort of royalty.”); see Philip Mendes, To License a 
Patent—Or to Assign It: Factors Influencing Choice, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
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In the normal course of business, such royalties result from the 
willing negotiations between a licensee and a patent holder of 
the patented article.63 Once the parties have instead sought 
resolution through litigation, however, discussions are far 
removed from “willing” negotiations that exist in the normal 
course of business.64 In determining what constitutes a 
“reasonable royalty” for the purpose of damage remedy, the 
court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 
enumerated fifteen factors,65 which have since been used by 
                                                          
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/license_assign_patent.htm#
author (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
 63. Cf. DURHAM, supra note 12, at 183 (“A reasonable royalty is the 
amount that the infringer would have paid the patentee if, instead of 
infringing the patent, it had negotiated a license.”). 
 64. Cf. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a 
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the 
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to 
reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who 
desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell 
a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have been 
willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and 
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was 
willing to grant a license.”). 
 65. Id. The court enumerated the following factors: 
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the 
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents 
comparable to the patent in suit. 3. The nature and scope of the 
license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-
restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold. 4. The licensor’s established 
policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly 
by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting 
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that 
monopoly. 5. The commercial relationship between the licensor 
and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same 
territory in the same line of business; or whether they are 
inventor and promoter. 6. The effect of selling the patented 
specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; 
that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator 
of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such 
derivative or convoyed sales. 7. The duration of the patent and 
term of the license. 8. The established profitability of the product 
made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current 
popularity. 9. The utility and advantages of the patent property 
over the old modes or devices; if any, that had been for working 
out similar results. 10. The nature of the patented invention; the 
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courts to construct a “hypothetical negotiation” between the 
parties to litigation.66 A reasonable royalty is viewed as the 
statutory minimum amount necessary to compensate the 
patentee for the defendant’s infringement, once liability is 
found.67 
3. The Panduit Test and Entitlement to Lost Profits 
To avoid what some view as less-than-adequate 
compensation under Georgia-Pacific’s reasonable-royalty 
calculation,68 plaintiffs may seek to assess their entitlement to 
                                                          
character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and 
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used 
the invention. 11. The extent to which the infringer has made use 
of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that 
use. 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may 
be customary in the particular business or in comparable 
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous 
inventions. 13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be 
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented 
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or 
significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 14. 
The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 15. The amount that 
a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement 
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to 
reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent 
licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a 
license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying 
the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a 
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which 
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who 
was willing to grant a license. 
Id.  
 66. See DURHAM, supra note 12, at 184. 
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant 
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made 
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court.”). 
 68. See generally Patent Damages Primer: Damages Under the Patent 
Statute, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/primer/ (last visited Feb. 1, 
2013) (“A danger in the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach, 
particularly for the infringer, is taking the name too literally and building a 
damages defense around a very low actual royalty rate the parties might have 
negotiated in the real world. Reasonable royalty damages can be different 
from any pre-infringement, real-world royalty the parties would have actually 
negotiated. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has routinely affirmed ‘reasonable 
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lost profits.69 These are profits the patentee would have made 
without the defendant’s alleged infringement.70 In Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit articulated a fundamental framework providing four 
factors that govern the determination of a plaintiff’s 
entitlement to recover lost profits due to infringement.71 This is 
“the most widely used test for determining lost-profits 
damages,” and is employed by the Federal Circuit as an 
“acceptable method of determining profits.”72 In short, Panduit 
describes a four-step test to determine how events would have 
transpired in a relevant marketplace “but for” the defendant’s 
alleged infringement.73 
4. Grain Processing Is Critical to Panduit Analysis 
The Panduit factors are applied in damages assessments to 
determine whether, without the infringer’s actions in the 
relevant market, the patentee could have captured the sales 
and profits made by the infringer.74 Panduit requires that the 
                                                          
royalty’ awards in excess of what the parties would have actually agreed to as 
a result of licensing negotiations prior to infringement.”). 
 69. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable 
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 661 (2009) (“[I]t is not only possible 
but common that lost profits will exceed the defendant’s gains from 
infringement. The idea that patent damages tend to be greater in lost profits 
cases than in reasonable royalty cases makes sense for policy purposes, so long 
as the reasonable royalty awards go to patentees who are not in fact selling 
products in the market.” (footnote omitted)). 
 70. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 417 (2d 
ed. 1991) (“Lost profits may be in the form of diverted sales, eroded prices, or 
increased expenses.”); Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 827 (“A patent holder 
can lose profits to an infringer in several ways. By far the most important 
source of lost profits is the sales that the patent holder lost to the infringer. 
Absent the infringement (often termed the “but-for” world), the patent holder 
would have made some or all of the sales that the infringer made. The 
damages associated with these lost sales are the incremental profits that the 
patent holder would have made on the sales.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 71. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th 
Cir. 1978); Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 833 (“In attempting to ascertain 
whether to award lost profits, American courts often refer to the ‘Panduit 
factors,’ all of which must be satisfied for an award of lost profits . . . .”). 
 72. Chretien, supra note 8, at 1495–96. 
 73. Id. 
 74. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (“To get lost profits as actual damages, the patent owner must 
demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the 
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plaintiff prove (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence 
of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) the plaintiff’s 
capabilities to manufacture and market; and thus exploit 
market demand; and (4) the amount of the profit the plaintiff 
would have earned “but for” the infringement.75 
In many cases, the plaintiff may readily qualify under 
several of the Panduit factors. The first Panduit factor, demand 
for the patented product, is established by examining the 
existing and forecasted product sales enjoyed by the patent 
holder or its licensees.76 As a practical matter, a patent holder’s 
established relationship with its licensee, or as a current 
participant in the relevant market, make this determination of 
patented product sales readily amenable to economic 
analysis.77 Similarly, the plaintiff may be aided by ease of 
access to the information necessary to show the marketing and 
manufacturing capabilities required under the third Panduit 
factor.78 Calculation of the profits lost “but-for” infringement, 
the fourth factor, logically flows from establishing proof of the 
“demand” and “supply” factors,79 and requires an “estimation of 
                                                          
infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales . . . . [W]e have 
accepted [Panduit] as a nonexclusive standard for determining lost profits.”). 
 75. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
 76. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he first Panduit factor simply asks whether demand 
existed for the patented product, i.e., a product that is covered by the patent in 
suit’ or that ‘directly competes with the infringing device.’” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 598 
(5th Cir. 1963) (“The substantial sales made prove a demand.”). 
 77. See MICHAEL C. KEELEY, ESTIMATING DAMAGES IN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (1999), available at 
http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/d578b7e4-be8d-4b0a-9cd5-
a79d1081b866/Estimating-Damages-in-Patent-Infringement-Cases.aspx. 
 78. Cf. Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 17–18 (“To satisfy the third 
factor, capacity to exploit the demand for the patented product, the patent 
owner may need to present evidence of such things as excess manufacturing 
capacity, ability to obtain financing, and ability to market additional units of 
the product. Disputes most frequently center, however, on application of the 
second factor . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 79. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 5 (“[T]he fourth Panduit factor requires 
economic analysis of the incremental costs the firm would have incurred in 
meeting [additional] demand. This relates to the third Panduit factor, 
‘manufacturing and marketing capacity.’”). Of course, the first Panduit factor 
would also aid in this incremental cost analysis by determining what the 
demand is for the particular product. 
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the patent holder’s incremental profit on the additional 
sales.”80 
In contrast to these three factors, the remaining Panduit 
factor, involving absence of acceptable noninfringing 
substitutes, remains a substantial hurdle to the plaintiff’s 
claim for lost profits.81 Generally, the plaintiff must show that 
during the period of infringement, or the “accounting period,” 
the plaintiff’s customers purchased the defendant’s product 
specifically because of the advantages bestowed upon that 
product by the allegedly infringed patent.82 Put differently, 
without the patented advantages, customers would not have 
purchased the allegedly infringing product at the price or terms 
offered. Complicating proof of the second factor, competing 
products are generally not “perfect substitutes” in the 
marketplace, which leaves open disputes pertaining to the 
degree of substitutability.83 Also, the difficulty of proving the 
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes has been made 
more challenging by the addition of criteria from Grain 
Processing, upon which the alleged infringer can rely.84 
D. GRAIN PROCESSING 
1. Procedural History 
On appeal from the Northern District of Indiana, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Grain 
Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co. issued a 
panel decision in 1999 to deny lost profits damages to the 
                                                          
 80. Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 834. 
 81. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 4 (providing an example of calculating 
the “degree of substitution” of a product and the uncertainty and difficulty 
some demand-and-supply-side factors may cause in the calculation of 
Panduit’s second “absence of noninfringing alternatives” element); Blair & 
Cotter, supra note 22, at 18–20. 
 82. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Thus, to prove that there are no acceptable 
noninfringing substitutes, the patent owner must show either that (1) the 
purchasers in the marketplace generally were willing to buy the patented 
product for its advantages, or (2) the specific purchasers of the infringing 
product purchased on that basis.”). 
 83. See KEELEY, supra note 77, at 5. 
 84. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc. 318 F.3d 1119, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(discussing the additional criteria under Grain Processing of equipment, 
know-how, and experience in order to show availability of a non-infringing 
alternative); Chretien, supra note 8, at 1505. 
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patentee following a complex procedural history.85 The court 
ruled that the defendant proved that a noninfringing substitute 
was available even though the substitute was not, in fact, on 
the market or actually for sale during the period of alleged 
infringement.86 Furthermore, the court held that the patentee 
failed to show lost profits under a required reconstruction of 
the market as it would have developed “but for” the defendant’s 
alleged infringement.87 The court opined that even though the 
defendant’s substitute was not perfect, it was an “acceptable” 
substitute, thus satisfying Panduit, because the differences 
between the patented product and its substitute were 
“irrelevant to consumers.”88 
2. The Legal Contribution of Grain Processing 
Grain Processing has substantially altered modern lost 
profits analysis. Prior analysis was conducted to determine 
whether infringement of a particular patented article caused 
the patentee to lose customers,89 and to quantify the sort of 
sales the patentee would have made absent the infringement.90 
In Grain Processing, however, the Federal Circuit examined 
the value of the patentee’s exclusionary right in a “but for” 
marketplace, which is described as a “hypothetical world” 
                                                          
 85. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s second decision denying lost 
profits to Grain Processing Corporation); Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. 
Maize-Prods. Co., Nos. 95-1506, 95-1507, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9918 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 20, 1997) (vacating the district court’s decision in an unpublished 
opinion); Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 979 F. Supp. 1233 
(N.D. Ind. 1997) (reaffirming its previous decision to deny lost profits to Grain 
Processing Corporation on the same non-infringing substitutes grounds); 
Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ind. 
1995) (holding that Grain Processing Corporation could not prove lost profits 
damages because of the availability of non-infringing substitutes). 
 86. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1356 (“Thus, with proper economic proof 
of availability, as American Maize provided the district court in this case, an 
acceptable substitute not on the market during the infringement may 
nonetheless become part of the lost profits calculus and therefore limit or 
preclude those damages.”). 
 87. Id. at 1355. 
 88. Id. at 1348 (discussing the conclusions of the district court, which the 
Federal Circuit affirmed). 
 89. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 162 
n.57 (1999) (“Earlier cases had focused on whether customer demand for the 
entire item could be attributed to the patented component or feature.”). 
 90. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 31, at 1287. 
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absent the alleged infringement.91 As a result, the inquiry was 
supplemented with an additional determination that sought to 
assess “alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have 
undertaken had he not infringed.”92 Perhaps this 
determination had signaled a meaningful shift in court 
rationale and had brought legal analysis more in line with the 
economic realities of patent infringement.93 However, it seems 
that if a “perfect market substitute” could potentially be 
concocted and made available by the alleged infringer, it 
follows that a patentee’s right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling that article has little value.94 The patentee’s 
remedy for infringement would then be limited to payment for 
a license, typically a reasonable royalty.95 
3. Effect of Grain Processing on Legal Standard 
The court in Grain Processing, therefore, transformed the 
mechanical application of a once bright-line legal standard into 
a more accurate determination with substantial evidence on 
both sides of the issue.96 Grain Processing has since stood for 
the proposition that even if the plaintiff substantially proves 
that most of the Panduit factors are satisfied, the alleged 
infringer may avoid paying lost profits damages by showing 
that it simply had the “equipment” and “know-how” necessary 
to “instantaneously” produce and introduce a consumer-
acceptable, noninfringing substitute with “little effort.”97 This 
approach marked a noticeable shift in the Federal Circuit’s 
move “towards a more thoughtful consideration of economic 
                                                          
 91. Id. 
 92. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350–51. 
 93. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1514 (“Grain Processing is an example 
of the recent trend of using economic principles to address . . . problems in 
patent damage calculations. Proponents of this approach assert that economic-
based analysis improves the chances that damage awards will provide 
adequate compensation to the patent holder.” (footnote omitted)). 
 94. See Hausman et al., supra note 4, at 835. 
 95. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1506, 1518–19; Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. 
U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 96. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[F]air and 
accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also must take into account, 
where relevant, alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have 
undertaken had he not infringed.”). 
 97. See id. 
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realities.”98 Grain Processing has remained reliable precedent, 
and its principles were reaffirmed in Sprectralytics, Inc. v. 
Cordis Corp. in 2011.99 
II. PRE- AND POST-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES 
The following section summarizes court actions resulting 
from six Federal Circuit lost profits appeals. Three of these 
appeals were decided pre-Grain Processing and three others 
post-Grain Processing.100 This Note uses these cases as factual 
inputs to further understand the Grain Processing decision, 
and analyzes both sets of cases to observe regular economic 
assumptions the courts have used in the normal course of their 
lost profits damages analysis. 
A. PRE-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES 
1. State Industries Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. 
State Industries Inc., v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. involved a 
patent covering a method of insulating residential gas water 
heaters.101 State argued that the damages award, which 
combined a reasonable royalty and lost profits, was too low in 
light of the gross profits Mor-Flo had made selling an allegedly 
infringing product.102 Mor-Flo disagreed, maintaining that 
                                                          
 98. Michael A. Morin, Processing Grain: Lost Profits Damages and Some 
Practical Considerations for the Patent Litigator, FINNEGAN.COM, 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=c29ba55
0-8c55-4b4f-a9a5-b2c72b1749c4 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 99. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 100. These cases were selected from a small pool of relevant cases that 
seemed to turn on facts similar to the Grain Processing inquiry. All were 
published opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
 101. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1575–76 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). At the time of this litigation, two types of water heater insulation—
fiberglass and foam—dominated the market. State’s method involved an 
effective way of injecting foam insulation into the heater while also preventing 
the foam from invading the water heater’s working components. The process 
involved wrapping the heater with an envelope-shaped plastic sheet, 
mounting a surrounding metal jacket and cover, and finally injecting foam 
through an opening into the envelope. Mor-Flo’s method, on the other hand, 
used a cylindrical-shaped rather than an envelope-shaped plastic sheet, and 
injected foam through the top. Id. 
 102. State had cross-appealed a favorable judgment from the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee awarding lost profit damages due 
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there were other acceptable noninfringing alternatives to the 
alleged infringing product on the market.103 
Despite Mor-Flo’s arguments, the court upheld the lost 
profits damages because there were no acceptable 
noninfringing alternatives on the market during the 
infringement period.104 The court rejected common fiberglass 
insulation as an acceptable substitute for foam insulation 
included in the litigant’s water heaters.105 In addition, the 
court turned to comparisons between three foam insulation 
methods that were arguably available at the time of 
infringement.106 The court concluded that none of the three 
foam insulations were sufficiently available noninfringing 
alternatives.107 State v. Mor-Flo is also noted for the court’s 
market-share approach, which considers the amount of 
relevant market share the patent holder lost to infringing 
competitors as a basis for damages.108 
                                                          
to infringement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989 
affirmed the lower court’s decision but vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration of willful infringement and enhanced damages. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1579. 
 104. Id. at 1578–79. 
 105. Id. However, the court later reduced the reasonable royalty because 
fiberglass insulation did directly compete with foam. Id. at 1581. Further, 
foam insulation was superior as a denser material having greater insulating 
qualities, added dent resistance, and allowed for smaller heaters. Id. at 1576. 
 106. Id. at 1579. 
 107. Two of these methods—the “top-off” method and the fiberglass “foam 
stop” method—failed as redeeming substitutes because Mor-Flo had 
insufficient evidence to prove with certainty that either method was in fact 
available during the infringement period. Id. But it did not prove that either 
the “top-off” method or fiberglass foam stops were available during the period 
of infringement. Id. Mor-Flo’s competitor even testified that they had started 
using the “top-off” method during the infringement period, but he was unsure 
when. Id. The third method—the Rheem-patented plastic foam belt—was 
actually used by Rheem during the period of infringement. Id. The court, 
however, dismissed the Rheem method as an acceptable alternative because 
Mor-Flo presented no evidence showing that the method could have been 
licensed and at what cost. Id. at 1581. As a result, lost profit damages were 
upheld because there were no acceptable non-infringing alternatives on the 
market during the infringement period. Id. at 1579. 
 108. Id. at 1576; see Roy J. Epstein, The Market Share Rule with Price 
Erosion: Patent Infringement Lost Profits Damages After Crystal, 31 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 3–4 (2003). 
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2. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp. 
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp. concerned an industrial-product 
patent for an interferometer.109 On appeal Wyko, the alleged 
infringer, argued that lost profits damages were inappropriate 
because its previously discontinued interferometer, named 
SIRIS, was an acceptable noninfringing alternative.110 Zygo’s 
main assertion was that Wyko’s previous SIRIS model was 
discontinued and not actually available on the market.111 
The court was unconvinced that Zygo was entitled to lost 
profits as Wyko’s SIRIS strongly resembled an acceptable 
noninfringing alternative. The court favorably compared 
Wyko’s SIRIS model with Zygo’s Mark IV.112 The court also 
considered SIRIS similar to Wyko’s new “Wyko 6000” model.113 
Satisfied with its determination that SIRIS was an “acceptable” 
alternative, the court vacated and remanded Zygo’s lost profits 
award back to the trial court.114 
                                                          
 109. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996). An 
interferometer is a device used to measure wavelengths, wave velocities, small 
distances, and thicknesses. See Rüdiger Paschotta, Interferometers, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA LASER PHYSICS & TECH., http://www.rp-photonics.com/
interferometers.html (last updated May 28, 2013). 
 110. Zygo, 79 F.3d at 1565–66. Wyko Corp. appealed an adverse judgment 
of infringement by the U.S. Federal District Court of Arizona. Id. at 1565. In 
1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s finding of infringement for one model, the Wyko 6000, but reversed the 
finding of infringement for the second, the Wyko 6000 “redesign.” Id. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the trial 
court in order to recalculate damages. Id. 
 111. Wyko had discontinued its SIRIS model after it began to market and 
produce the Wyko 6000. Id. at 1571. 
 112. Id. at 1571. The court noted that SIRIS could test the same 
components, serve the same applications, and “there was nothing the Mark IV 
could do that the SIRIS . . . could not.” Id. Further, the court found that SIRIS 
and the Mark IV were both the same type of “phase-shifting Fizeau type 
interferometer.” Id. 
 113. The court observed that SIRIS was simply “repackaged” and renamed 
the Wyko 6000 and that software used for both of Wyko’s models was 
“basically the same.” Id. 
 114. Id. at 1571–72. The remand, however, included the important caveat 
noting that the non-infringing alternative must be “actual[ly] availabl[e] 
during some of the period the . . . Wyko [6000] models were on the market.” Id. 
at 1571. The court reasoned that the lost profits calculation was only a 
reflection of sales actually lost, not the “possibilit[y] of a hypothetical market 
which the infringer might have created.” Id. 
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3. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc. 
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc. involved a product-
patent lawsuit over a microfiltration membrane.115 The 
damages issue on appeal was whether an acceptable 
noninfringing alternative prevented Pall’s entitlement to lost 
profit damages.116 Pall asserted that the noninfringing 
alternative did not bar lost profits entitlement, but also that it 
was entitled to lost profits on all of Micron’s infringing sales.117 
The court held that availability of an acceptable 
noninfringing alternative did not preclude Pall’s entitlement to 
lost profits.118 The court acknowledged that an acceptable 
noninfringing alternative to Micron’s membrane existed in the 
nylon membrane market, made by Cuno. But, prior to the Pall-
Micron litigation, Cuno’s membrane infringed upon Pall’s 
patent,119 and Cuno had already entered into a licensing 
settlement with Pall. The court explored the impact of Cuno’s 
licensing settlement with Pall on Micron’s infringing 
membrane.120 As a result, the court held that Pall was entitled 
to lost profits because the only acceptable alternative, Cuno’s 
                                                          
 115. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). Microfiltration membranes are used to remove unwanted microscopic 
substances, such as bacteria, from fluids or to separate desired substances, 
such as antibodies. See Microfiltration Membrane Systems, SIEMENS, 
http://www.water.siemens.com/en/products/membrane_filtration_separation/m
icrofiltration_membrane_systems/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013). 
 116. Pall, 66 F.3d at 1222. Both parties appealed judgment of the U.S. 
District Court of Massachusetts finding Micron Separations had infringed, 
entitling Pall Corp. to damages. Id. at 1214–15. In 1995, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding of willful 
infringement, modifying and remanding the damages award back to the trial 
court for redetermination. Id. at 1215. The district court held that another 
participant in the nylon membrane industry, Cuno Corporation, was 
marketing an acceptable noninfringing alternative. Id. at 1222. Cuno’s 
membrane alternative, however, had previously been the subject of litigation 
with Pall, prior to Pall’s lawsuit against Micron. Id. at 1222–23. 
 117. Id. at 1222. 
 118. Cuno’s “voluntary settlement” with Pall did “not retrospectively 
transform an accused infringing product into a ‘noninfringing substitute,’” for 
the purposes of litigation with Micron. Id. at 1222–23. 
 119. Id. at 1222. The court limited the award of lost profits to the share of 
Micron’s sales that Pall would reasonably have made, taking into account 
Cuno’s post-settlement sales with Pall. Id. at 1223. 
 120. Id. at 1222–23. 
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membrane, was really an infringing one.121 Pall suggests that a 
compromise exists between patent value and a patentee’s 
entitlement to compensation in that lost profits were 
recognized but reduced accordingly.122 
B. POST-GRAIN PROCESSING CASES 
1. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain 
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. 
Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain 
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. involved a product-patent dispute 
over a particular type of scintillator crystal used in its positron 
emission tomography machines, also known as PET 
scanners.123 Saint-Gobain, the alleged infringer, argued that 
the existence of two acceptable noninfringing alternatives 
defeated Siemens’ entitlement to lost profits.124 Siemens 
responded that both alternatives were inferior and were 
therefore not sufficiently acceptable noninfringing alternatives 
in the “high-end” marketplace.125 
                                                          
 121. Id. The lower court’s damage award was affirmed, but damages as a 
result of Cuno’s settlement with Pall were remanded for recalculation. Id. at 
1223. 
 122. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 123. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & 
Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Positron emission tomography 
(“PET”) is a nuclear medical imaging technique that provides images and 
information about the chemical structure and function of a patient’s organ 
systems. See Positron Emission Tomography, MAYO CLINIC (May 7, 2011), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pet-scan/MY00238. 
 124. Siemens, 637 F.3d at 1287. The essential damages issue involved 
Siemen’s cross-appeal that the U.S. District Court of Delaware had erred in 
granting Saint-Gobain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law reducing the 
jury’s award of damages. Id. at 1274. The jury found that the defendant had 
infringed upon the plaintiff’s patent and awarded $52.3 million in damages. 
Id. at 1276. The judgment was reduced to $44.9 million by the trial court. Id. 
In 2011 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision on infringement but vacated and remanded the damages 
award, as it was understated by not including a reasonable royalty for those 
products that were made but not sold by the infringer. Id. at 1290–91. There 
were two possible noninfringing alternatives: one alternative, made by 
General Electric, used bismuth germinate scintillator (“BGO”) crystals. The 
other was a lanthanum bromide (“LaBr3”) scintillator crystal that Saint-
Gobain arguably could have produced. Id. at 1287. 
 125. Id. at 1288. There was testimony that BGO-based scanners did not 
compete with Siemens’ scanners in the high-end PET scanner market because 
BGO scanners had relatively low image quality and were purchased by low-
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The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a lack 
of acceptable noninfringing alternatives to permit Siemens to 
recover lost profits.126 The court evaluated the acceptability of 
Saint-Gobain’s argued alternatives,127 and, using the Grain 
Processing standard, gauged whether the noninfringing 
alternatives were actually available or on the market during 
the infringement period.128 Despite evidence that Siemens’ 
scintillator crystal was comparable to General Electric’s,129 the 
court found Saint Gobain’s noninfringing-alternative 
arguments unavailing and upheld Siemens’ entitlement to lost 
profits.130 
2. Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc. 
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc. involved a patent over 
a livestock and poultry feed-dispensing machine.131 Lextron 
argued, and a lower court found, that its Type 5 machine was 
an acceptable and available noninfringing substitute, which 
barred Micro’s entitlement to lost profits.132 
On appeal, the court found the lower court’s assessment 
unpersuasive and allowed Micro to present its case for lost 
profits.133 The court first conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
Grain Processing standards for availability of noninfringing 
alternatives.134 After examination of whether Lextron had the 
                                                          
budget customers while Siemen scanners were more expensive and were 
purchased by customers seeking the best in performance and technology. Id. 
at 1288. 
 126. Id. at 1289. 
 127. Id. at 1288–89 (deciding whether there was a two-supplier, high-end 
market for PET scanners). 
 128. Id. at 1288 (“Notwithstanding, the evidence reasonably supported a 
finding that LaBr3 was not an available alternative.”). 
 129. Id. at 1287 (“Saint-Gobain contends that GE’s BGO scanners 
competed with Siemens’ LSO scanners, because Siemens lost PET scanner 
sales to GE.”). 
 130. Id. at 1288 (“We perceive no legal error in the district court’s decision 
to permit the jury to award lost profits damages.”). 
 131. Micro Chem. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
Both Micro Chem. and Lextron placed their machines in customer feedlots at 
no charge, allowing them to sell microingredients to the feedlots at a 
premium. 
 132. Id. at 1121–23. 
 133. Id. at 1126. 
 134. Id. at 1223–24. The court reversed the district court’s finding that the 
Lextron Type 5 machine was available. Id. at 1224. Lextron therefore did not 
have the “necessary equipment, know-how, and experience to make the Type 5 
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equipment, know-how, and experience to manufacture and 
substitute its noninfringing machine for the allegedly 
infringing one, the court concluded that a noninfringing 
machine was not sufficiently available at the time of 
infringement.135 The court also held that Lextron had instead 
attempted to design around Micro’s patented technology after 
the suit was brought.136 
3. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc. 
Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc. concerned technology 
used in vending machines to authenticate coins.137 Mars argued 
it was entitled to lost profits based on sales made prior to Coin 
Acceptor’s (“Coinco’s”) introduction of alternative technology.138 
Coinco argued that lost profits should have been entirely 
excluded from calculation of a lost profits-influenced reasonable 
royalty rate.139 
The court upheld the exclusion of Mars’ lost profits claim, 
and affirmed the district court’s reasonable royalty 
calculation.140 The court first analyzed whether lost profits 
were appropriate given that Mars’ subsidiary, and not Mars 
itself, sustained losses from Coinco’s infringement.141 Second, 
despite finding a lost profits remedy inappropriate, the court 
                                                          
machine at the time of infringement.” Id. at 1123. Lextron had expended a 
significant amount of labor, taking over four months to convert all of its 
infringing machines to the non-infringing Type 5 machines. Id. 
 135. Id. (“This record shows that the Type 5 machine was not available at 
the time of infringement.”). 
 136. Id. (“To the contrary, the record shows that Lextron designed around 
the patented technology after Micro established infringement.”). 
 137. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 138. Id. at 1365. 
 139. Id. at 1372 (“First, Coinco argues that the district court erred by 
awarding a reasonable royalty rate higher than the cost to Coinco of 
implementing acceptable noninfringing alternatives. Second, Coinco argues 
that the reasonable royalty rate could not exceed 4%, in light of Mars’s 
representations to Inland Revenue. Finally, Coinco claims that the district 
court erred by relying on Coinco’s incremental profit, rather than its operating 
profit, to calculate a reasonable royalty.”). 
 140. Id. at 1374 (“[W]e affirm the district court’s summary judgment 
excluding Mars’s lost profits claim.”). The reasonable royalty rate, however, 
was not limited by the cost of Mars’s least expensive noninfringing alternative 
and the court seems to provide that the potential availability of noninfringing 
alternatives had an effect on the reasonable royalty rate. Id at 1373. 
 141. Id. at 1364–67. 
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used Grain Processing language in justifying its reasonable 
royalty calculation.142 The court seemed to establish that 
Coinco’s noninfringing alternatives were available—but not 
sufficiently available—to absolve Coinco of all lost profits 
damages owed to Mars.143 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. GRAIN PROCESSING FORMALIZED CONSIDERATIONS THAT 
WERE ALREADY LARGELY AT WORK FOR DETERMINING THE 
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF AVAILABLE NONINFRINGING 
ALTERNATIVES 
The three earlier cases analyzed show that, even before 
Grain Processing, courts were already positioned to deviate 
from Panduit when considering entitlement to lost profits 
damages affected by the availability of acceptable 
noninfringing alternatives. The Grain Processing precedent 
provided courts with further latitude when interpreting the 
existence of an available noninfringing alternative and 
entitlement to lost profits.144 Grain Processing seems to have 
provided litigants with a road map for the inquiry the Federal 
Circuit was previously, for the most part, inconsistently 
applying. While the presence of noninfringing alternatives, as 
defined under Grain Processing, precluded lost profits claims 
definitively in some instances, it failed to undermine claims for 
lost profits in other instances.145 
After Grain Processing, the courts applied the broader 
noninfringing-alternative standard to both support and deny 
the absence of available noninfringing alternatives. In Siemens 
                                                          
 142. Id. at 1373 (“There was, therefore, no available and acceptable non-
infringing alternative to which Coinco could have switched at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation; there was merely the possibility that it could have 
come up with one.”). 
 143. See id. (discussing how the district court reduced the blended royalty 
rate from 11.5% to 7%). 
 144. See generally Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 
F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“The availability of substitutes invariably 
will influence the market forces defining this ‘but for’ marketplace . . . . 
Moreover, a substitute need not be openly on sale to exert this influence. Thus, 
with proper economic proof of availability . . . an acceptable substitute not on 
the market during the infringement may nonetheless become part of the lost 
profits calculus and therefore limit or preclude those damages.”). 
 145. See supra Part II.A. 
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v. Saint-Gobain, despite the existence of an arguably 
acceptable noninfringing alternative on the scintillator crystal 
market, the court found lost profit damages appropriate.146 In 
doing so, the court found it prudent to distinguish between 
“high-end” and “low-end” scintillator crystals, notwithstanding 
the evident arbitrariness of such a classification, as it invoked 
Grain Processing standards to bolster its analysis.147 The 
court’s end-run on Panduit’s noninfringing alternative hurdle 
appears little more than an exercise in legal gymnastics. 
In the pre-Grain Processing example of State v. Mor-Flo, if 
the Panduit standard had been adhered to strictly, the court’s 
recognition of Mor-Flo’s ability to in-license (and ultimately 
develop) an available and acceptable noninfringing alternative 
should have barred lost profits recovery. Yet, the court 
concluded: “we see no objection [to the lower court’s decision] 
not to allow Mor-Flo to rely on the availability of third party 
patents to mitigate damages.”148 Even after explicit 
acknowledgment of the potential of a noninfringing alternative 
method, the court denied its existence in determining lost 
profits entitlement.149 The court seemed uninterested or 
unwilling to adhere to Panduit, and to apply it consistently. 
B. GRAIN PROCESSING HAS HAD A DEMONSTRABLE, BUT 
PERIPHERAL, IMPACT 
One might also think that prior to Grain Processing, the 
four Panduit factors were sufficient and were guided by a well-
developed body of case law ready for application.150 But it 
becomes apparent, especially in the three cases prior to Grain 
Processing, that application of the Panduit factors and their 
effects on lost profits entitlement is strained.151 In this manner, 
                                                          
 146. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & 
Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1287–89 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 147. The arbitrariness was evidenced by overlapping sales between what 
the court argues as discrete categories of PET scan machines. See id. at 1288. 
 148. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 149. Id. (“The district court may have overlooked that the Rheem patented 
plastic foam belt might have provided an alternative way to foam insulate 
heaters, but Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have licensed the 
Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”). 
 150. See Chretien, supra note 8, at 1495–96. 
 151. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 
1995); State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577–81. 
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Grain Processing could have served to clarify or, by acting as 
an added guide post, to formalize further specific criteria that 
the courts should consider and the litigants should address. 
The addition of such criteria has provided courts a further-
reaching, and potentially more solid, evidentiary basis for 
decisions on entitlement to certain forms of damages. Both 
litigating parties now have more than adequate incentive to 
provide evidence and expert testimony necessary to prove, or 
disprove, the capabilities and capacities necessary to produce a 
noninfringing alternative under Panduit. Some of the evident 
strain with application of Panduit seems to dissipate after 
additional criteria defining a noninfringing alternative were 
formalized by Grain Processing. 
Prior to Grain Processing, State v. Mor-Flo’s dubious 
application of Panduit’s noninfringing-alternative test is 
noticeable.152 Despite the court’s awareness of at least one 
acceptable noninfringing alternative to State’s patented 
method, the court’s probe goes no further because “Mor-Flo 
presented no evidence that it could have licensed the 
[alternative] foam [injection method], and at what cost.”153 
Even though the court identified an available noninfringing 
alternative, it required more proof than the mere existence of 
such an alternative.154 However, the court did apply an 
approach later formalized in Grain Processing. Its near-
summary denial of a recognized alternative turns on concerns 
of the cost of and legal access to a potentially licensable 
                                                          
 152. See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1579 (“The district court may have erred 
in finding that the Rheem foam belt method likely infringed because the 
patent on the foam belt was issued before and was cited as prior art in the ‘377 
patent. But we need not decide. Foam insulation was the source of customer 
demand and the only two available ways to do it, State’s and Rheem’s, were 
patented. It therefore is probable, in light of the district court’s undisputed 
finding that customers did not care about the particular method used, that 
both State and Rheem would have sold their market shares of Mor-Flo’s 
infringing sales.”). 
 153. Id. at 1581. 
 154. Id. at 1579 (“[T]here were other methods available—the Rheem 
patented plastic foam belt, the ‘top-off’ method, and the fiberglass foam 
stop . . . .”); id. at 1581 (“The district court may have overlooked that the 
Rheem patented plastic foam belt might have provided an alternative way to 
foam insulate heaters, but Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have 
licensed the Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”). 
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alternative.155 The court in State v. Mor-Flo might have been 
concerned with, as Grain Processing would later articulate, 
Mor-Flo’s inability to “instantaneously” produce a customer-
acceptable substitute with “little effort.”156 
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc. exemplifies a 
similarly tortured application of Panduit, with no apparent 
resolution.157 This might have been solved if the standard of 
Grain Processing had been available to be applied. The court 
allowed limited lost profits, in spite of the availability of an 
acceptable noninfringing alternative.158 While the decision 
turned on factual peculiarities, the court’s conclusion was that 
Micron’s noninfringing alternative was actually both 
noninfringing and infringing.159 The court attempted to resolve 
this dilemma by distinguishing between a noninfringing 
alternative that was not a “legal noninfringing alternative” for 
the purpose of Pall’s entitlement to all lost profits, but that was 
a “market noninfringing alternative” for the purpose of 
determining the proportional amount of lost profits that Pall 
was entitled to in addition to a reasonable royalty.160 Micron, 
as a result, had to pay a combination of a reasonable royalty 
and a portion of lost profits after Pall settled with Cuno.161 
In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., it is possible that 
a hypothetical application of Grain Processing could have 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 1581 (“Mor-Flo presented no evidence that it could have licensed 
the Rheem foam belt, and at what cost.”).Whether Mor-Flo could have licensed 
from its competitor, Rheem, shows concern of legal access, while “at what cost” 
shows concern of whether it may have been prohibitively expensive to use 
Rheem’s method. 
 156. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 
1356 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“American Maize could readily obtain all of the 
materials needed for Process IV.”). 
 157. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff shall be awarded lost profits on twenty-
five percent of the defendant’s infringing sales even after the settlement of two 
third parties that had acceptable non-infringing alternatives). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1222–23 (“The voluntary settlement of litigation does not 
retrospectively transform an accused infringing product into a ‘noninfringing 
substitute.’”); id. at 1223 (“However, after Pall settled with Cuno, the district 
court correctly held that Cuno’s presence in the marketplace could not be 
ignored . . . .”). 
 160. Id. at 1222 (“The district court should have recognized the distinction 
between the legal and market situation before and after the licensing of the 
Cuno products.”). 
 161. Id. at 1223. 
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entirely sidestepped the issue of whether entitlement to lost 
profits would be warranted, if a complex alternative was 
available. By barring a patentee’s entitlement to lost profits 
damages when noninfringing alternatives are available, Grain 
Processing suggests that compensation for infringement should, 
to an extent, reflect the value of the patent.162 Thus, if strong 
alternatives exist, the value of the patent-in-suit is 
correspondingly low.163 However, as mentioned above,164 Pall 
seems to suggest a compromise between patent value, and a 
patentee’s entitlement to compensation in a case in which lost 
profits should be recognized but reduced accordingly.165 It 
seems odd that the court did not simply deny lost profits 
damages altogether, rather than using the information 
available to increase the award above a reasonable royalty 
determined under Georgia-Pacific.166 Thus, even if Grain 
Processing had been applied, the court might have effectively 
distinguished its decision in such a way to avoid the 
                                                          
 162. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 
1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 163. James E. Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent 
Characteristics 6 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-46, 2006), 
available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patval.pdf (“A patent might 
depreciate because of technological obsolescence (the underlying invention 
becomes less valuable) or because competitors are able to ‘invent around’ the 
patent.”). 
 164. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 165. See Pall, 66 F.3d at 1223 (“However, after Pall settled with Cuno, the 
district court correctly held that Cuno’s presence in the marketplace could not 
be ignored, and limited the award of lost profits to the share of MSI’s sales 
that Pall would reasonably have made.”). However, this point could also be 
explained by an analysis of Pall’s market share. Before Pall’s settlement with 
Cuno, Micron deprived Pall of all of its infringing sales. After the Pall-Cuno 
settlement, however, only a portion of Micron’s sales would have deprived Pall 
of sales, and the remaining sales lawfully would have gone to Cuno. 
 166. In Georgia-Pacific, the court used the following guidelines for 
computing a reasonable royalty: 
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee 
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the 
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily 
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent 
licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to 
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented 
invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be 
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been 
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license. 
Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
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determination of whether a noninfringing alternative was 
clearly available, instead of interpreting it as a matter of 
degree. 
C. GRAIN PROCESSING HAS APPARENTLY ENCOURAGED MORE 
ROBUST PROOFS 
The definitive impact of Grain Processing seems to be the 
court’s enforcement of a broad, but formalized, set of additional 
criteria, thus making it more difficult for patentees to 
substantiate their entitlement to lost profits.167 Patentees 
interested in obtaining lost profits must now proffer enough 
evidence to negate the infringer’s innate capability to create, 
develop, in-license, produce, and/or sell noninfringing 
alternatives, even if such alternatives were not on the market 
at the time of the alleged infringement.168 This, in effect, aligns 
the litigants’ lost profits interest (whether proving or 
disproving entitlement) with the court’s interest in requiring a 
more robust evidentiary record that is essential for accurate 
evaluation.169 Because of the need for greater amounts of 
additional information, courts’ resources are likely to be taxed, 
which may lead to more time-consuming litigation as cases 
become more complex.170 
Even though the application of Grain Processing may 
conceivably foreclose the lost profits remedy for many 
patentees, the effects of Grain Processing have been beneficial 
because courts have been allowed to create more specialized 
solutions. Three general categories of such solutions show the 
accuracy-versus-increased-workload tradeoffs. First, a patentee 
that is not entitled to lost profits is limited to a reasonable 
                                                          
 167. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“American Maize 
also had all of the necessary equipment, know-how, and experience . . . .”). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See generally Axel Schmitt-Nilson, The Unpredictability of Patent 
Litigation Damage Awards: Causes and Comparative Notes, 3 INTELL. PROP. 
BRIEF 53 (2012) (explaining that, in general, the intellectual property “value 
inquiry [is] highly contextual and fact-specific” and that important factors in 
this analysis include “the likelihood of invalidity of the patent, the size of the 
market for the protected product, and the availability of substitutes for the 
patented technology”). 
 170. See generally Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent 
Cases?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 4, 2004 at 1 (discussing the rise in “the 
complexity and the importance of patent infringement cases” and how 
restructuring the adjudication process may be necessary). 
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royalty.171 In this situation, any additional claim for lost profits 
would only benefit the reasonable-royalty evaluation by further 
improving the record. Second, some patentees, whether or not 
they are entitled to lost profits, would erroneously be allowed, 
or otherwise, denied lost profit entitlement. A more robust 
record in these situations, however, supports a more rigorous 
appellate process and at the same time, maintains the ability 
to adjust the reasonable-royalty award, which is a valuable 
safety valve. Third, patentees able to meet the Grain 
Processing and Panduit standards would be entitled to lost 
profits. These three specialized pathways show that the added 
Grain Processing rigor errs on incentivizing more, rather than 
less, information disclosure during the trial process. Thus, the 
court seems to hedge the potentially more costly lost profits 
award against the minimum reasonable royalty bar, while only 
risking increased accuracy and workload in damages 
determinations. The pre-Grain Processing cases, when 
compared with those post-Grain Processing, offer ample 
evidence of a trend toward more robust proofs. 
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., for example, explicit 
lost profits damages were denied, and a reasonable royalty 
provided the necessary safety valve to afford adequate 
compensation to the patentee.172 The lost-profits-influenced 
reasonable royalty rate was reduced from 11.5% to 7%, which 
was still higher than the 4% rate argued during trial,173 and 
was affirmed on the basis that Coinco did not have, but could 
have made, an acceptable noninfringing alternative.174 Even 
though lost profits per se were excluded, the court covertly 
revealed strands of Grain Processing to justify its higher 
reasonable royalty.175 This, along with the lower court’s forty-
                                                          
 171. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant 
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made 
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court.”). 
 172. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 173. Id. at 1373–74. 
 174. Id. at 1372–73. 
 175. Id. at 1372–73 (“First, Coinco is simply wrong to suggest that the 
district court found that there were available, acceptable, non-infringing 
alternatives. What the district court found was that ‘Coinco had the ability, 
the resources, and the desire to design around Mars’ patents,’ that ‘it could 
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six page analysis under Georgia-Pacific, provided a nearly 
unassailable answer to Coinco’s question about the propriety of 
a higher reasonable royalty.176 Thus, the court had a fair, 
tailor-made remedy to Mars’ particular factual 
circumstances.177 
In cases in which the entitlement to lost profits is 
questioned, such as in Zygo Corp., any additional information 
submitted in hopes of achieving lost profits would contribute to 
a more credible court remedy.178 The court specifically noted 
the anemic evidential record in Zygo, a pre-Grain-Processing 
case.179 The court opined that “while sparse” it seemed contrary 
to find no available noninfringing alternative.180 Wyko’s SIRIS 
could have been available as an alternative, if it had not begun 
to market its new Wyko 6000 model.181 In this case, if Grain 
Processing would have been available and applied, the 
availability of Wyko’s SIRIS as a noninfringing alternative 
might have limited Zygo’s entitlement to lost profits damages 
without controversy.182 Any additional information to support 
                                                          
probably figure out a way to avoid infringement,’ but that the available ‘design 
around was not as good as it would like.’ There was, therefore, no available 
and acceptable non-infringing alternative to which Coinco could have switched 
at the time of the hypothetical negotiation; there was merely the possibility 
that it could have come up with one.” (citations omitted)). 
 176. See id. at 1364 (“[T]he district court issued a detailed oral opinion 
from the bench (spanning forty-six transcript pages), analyzing the fifteen 
Georgia-Pacific factors and concluding that a blended 7% royalty rate for the 
two patents was reasonable.”). However, because the reasonable royalty 
exceeded the expected profit from use of the patented invention, Georgia 
Pacific’s “willing licensor willing licensee” negotiation rationale seems to be 
compromised. Thus, it appears that the court’s decision is not so unassailable. 
 177. See id. at 1373 (“Coinco had the ability, the resources, and the desire 
to design around Mars’ patents.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 178. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“The court’s findings should include details regarding the similarities and 
differences between SIRIS, Mark IV, and Mark IVxp Interferometers.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (“Zygo bore the burden of proof and the record evidence, while 
sparse, suggests a contrary conclusion, at least as to the Mark IV 
interferometer.”). 
 181. See id. (“The record indicates that Wyko stopped marketing the SIRIS 
interferometer when it began marketing the Wyko 6000 interferometer . . . . A 
lost profits award reflects the realities of sales actually lost, not the 
possibilities of a hypothetical market which the infringer might have 
created.”). 
 182. Because Wyko had been a previous manufacturer of the non-
infringing alternative, there is little doubt that Grain Processing would have 
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Zygo’s claim of lost profits might have also provided reason to 
increase the reasonable royalty rate under Georgia-Pacific.183 
Unlike Zygo Corp., which was decided before Grain 
Processing, the benefits of the additional information 
necessitated by the Grain Processing decision are revealed in 
Micro Chem.184 The district court in Micro Chem. summarily 
denied Micro’s lost profits claim by providing that a 
noninfringing alternative was readily available.185 However, 
this decision was vacated on appeal.186 As a result of Lextron’s 
Grain Processing defense, the district court record provided a 
more detailed factual record as to the availability of Lextron’s 
noninfringing alternative.187 The evidence allowed for a robust 
inquiry at the appellate level, even when lost profits were 
denied on a motion for summary judgment rather than after 
trial.188 The problem of an anemic evidential record that 
plagued pre-Grain Processing cases, such as Zygo, was avoided 
in Micro Chem. because of the additional Grain Processing 
hurdle. While the exact contribution of this more robust record 
is difficult to ascertain, Micro Chem. illustrates how Grain 
Processing might have aided litigation accuracy, a necessary 
component for a credible court remedy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has endeavored to analyze whether Federal 
Circuit lost profit appeals have or would have been influenced 
by the Grain Processing standard. This Note examined three 
industrial product patent cases before, and three additional 
                                                          
limited lost profits here. See Zygo Corp., 79 F.3d at 1571 (“It is axiomatic, 
however, that if a device is not available for purchase, a defendant cannot 
argue that the device is an acceptable noninfringing alternative for the 
purposes of avoiding a lost profits award.”). 
 183. See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (discussing the factors relevant for determining a reasonable 
royalty). Factors five, eight, nine, and twelve are particularly relevant to a lost 
profits analysis. 
 184. See generally Micro Chem. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1120 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (“[A] technology not on the market at the time of infringement can, 
in certain circumstances, constitute an available, noninfringing alternative.”). 
 185. Id. at 1120. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 1122 (discussing why the Type 5 machine was available 
under Grain Processing). 
 188. See id. at 1123–26. 
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cases after, Grain Processing. In analyzing these cases, this 
Note showed that the standards set out in Grain Processing 
have had an effect on these decisions. Grain Processing 
standards appear to stand out as a formal articulation of 
common-sense economic concepts that courts were already 
applying even before the Grain Processing ruling. However, 
Grain Processing provided additional clarity by establishing a 
standardized set of criteria to evaluate available noninfringing 
alternatives.189 The decision could have allowed for more 
accurate decisions at the trial-court level, and subsequently for 
the Federal Circuit, by supplementing the evidentiary record. 
Thus, Grain Processing seems to have had subtle, but 
definitive, influence on lost profits damages. 
 
                                                          
 189. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“American Maize had all of the necessary equipment, know-
how, and experience to use Process IV to make Lo-Dex 10 . . . .”). 
